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BRIEF OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS AS
AMICUS CURIAE
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), with the consent of the
parties1 respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, in
support of the petition of Robert D. Potts ("Potts"), seeking reversal of the Opinion and Order
Imposing Remedial Sanctions of the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued on
September 24, 1997. The SEC sanctioned Potts for "improper professional conduct" in
performing duties as a concurring reviewer during an audit of certain financial statements in
1988 and 1989.
INTEREST OF THE AICPA AS AMICUS CURIAE
The AICPA is the national organization of the certified public accounting profession, with more
than 340,000 members. It seeks to promote high professional standards of practice, and has come

to be accepted by the profession, the public, and the SEC as an authoritative source of standards
and procedures in its field. In particular, the AICPA develops the standards that, after exposure,
comment and formal adoption, govern the conduct of audits by certified public accountants,
("CPAs") and are collectively known as "generally accepted auditing standards" ("GAAS").
The AICPA also established the Division for Firms and its SEC Practice Section ("SECPS") in
1977, as a response to public and congressional concern about the profession's oversight of
public company audits. Firms whose owners are members of the AICPA and that audit public
companies are required to be members in good standing of the SECPS. That, in turn, requires
firms to comply with certain guidelines promulgated by the SECPS and overseen by an
independent Public Oversight Board that supervises the process in the public interest.
SECPS guidelines promote compliance with an array of prophylactic practices designed to
provide heightened assurance that audits will be properly carried out. Those guidelines speak in
fairly general terms, and leave much discretion in implementation to individual SECPS member
firms.
This flexibility was not accidental, but was meant to balance several sets of competing, valid
interests. One was to avoid too-rigid a set of standards so that smaller firms would not find it
prohibitive to engage in audits of public companies.
Another was to balance the need for heightened prophylactic measures with the need to avoid
dilution of the undelegable responsibility of the partner-in-charge for compliance of the audit
with GAAS. This case implicates the second of these sets of concerns, as reflected in the
requirement that SECPS firms "[e]stablish policies and procedures ... for a concurring review of
the audit report and the financial statements by a partner other than the audit partner-in-charge."
AICPA, SECPS § 1000.08(f) (1997).
The SECPS published guidance as to the attributes of a concurring review, but left it to
individual firms to provide concurring partners with specific guidelines. The SECPS guidelines
also emphasized that the concurring reviewer did not displace the role of the partner-in-charge:
The purpose of the concurring review requirement is to provide additional assurance that (1) the
financial statements of SEC engagements ... are in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or other comprehensive basis of accounting and (2) the firm's report
thereon is in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Performance of a concurring
review does not relieve the partner in charge of the engagement from final responsibility for the
issuance of the firm's audit report...
AICPA, SECPS, Appendix E (October, 1988)2.
The interest of the AICPA as amicus in this case stems from the SEC's confusion of the SECPS
guidance with GAAS, its erroneous articulation of the duties of a concurring review partner
under the SECPS guidelines, and its unsupported determination that Petitioner's perceived
departure from its incorrectly defined standards could constitute him a threat to the investing
public or SEC processes.

Each of these conclusions has serious ramifications for the proper implementation of both GAAS
and the SECPS guidelines. The SEC's misapplication of the concurring review requirement both
overburdens the reviewing partner's role and dilutes accountability for the audit report. It will
prohibitively raise costs by requiring, in essence, two partners-in-charge, and sow confusion as to
the nature and required depth of a concurring review. The interpretations laid on the concurring
review requirement by the SEC are thus not only erroneous but counterproductive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We adopt Potts' Statement of the Case in his brief, and provide only a short review of the case
here.
Potts was the concurring partner for Touche Ross's audits of Kahler Corporation ("Kahler") for
the years 1988 and 1989. In 1987, Kahler acquired an interest in the University Park Hotel
("UPH") and decided to sell it in 1988. Kahler sought to capitalize the operating losses of UPH,
rather than deducting them against current income. To do this, Kahler had to meet the
requirements of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 30, and Emerging Task Force Issue
Nos. 85-36 and 84-28. Under these standards, to capitalize operating losses for a business
segment held for sale, there must be a reasonable assurance that a net gain will be realized on
disposition of the segment, and the seller must have a formal plan of disposition. Gregory
Melsen ("Melsen"), the partner-in-charge for the Kahler audits, determined after conducting the
annual audits, consulting with Potts and investigating further, that capitalization of the UPH's
operating losses was in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The details of
Potts' review of this conclusion and the audit evidence supporting it are fully described in his
brief and will not be reiterated here. Suffice it to say that it is uncontested that Potts' review
conformed to then-existing Touche Ross procedures which, in turn, had been adopted in
compliance with the SECPS guidelines discussed above.
In 1993, the SEC brought a proceeding under Rule 2(e)(1)3 of its Rules of Practice, charging
Potts with improper professional conduct in connection with these audits. The administrative law
judge found that Potts had engaged in improper professional conduct. On review, a majority of
the SEC agreed that the UPH loss treatment was inappropriate and Potts' review failed to meet
professional standards. It sanctioned Potts with a nine-month suspension from practice before the
Commission4.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SEC ERRED IN FINDING IMPROPER PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
A. The SEC Erred In Attributing GAAS Status To The SECPS Guidelines.

The SEC's determination that Potts engaged in improper professional conduct was based solely
on its findings that Potts, in his review as concurring partner, deviated from "the duties imposed
by GAAP and GAAS." Potts, Exchange Act Release No. 39,126, AAER No. 964, slip op. at 19
(Sept. 24, 1997). The SEC thus fundamentally misconstrued the standards applicable to a
concurring partner, and, in so doing, effectively announced a new standard and applied it

retroactively. Both the SEC description of the existing standard, and the newly-forged one, if
such it be, are erroneous and form no basis for discipline against Potts. The SECPS's requirement
of a concurring review pursuant to SECPS guidelines is not part of GAAS and is not required by
any SEC rule or regulation. It is, rather, a prudential requirement voluntarily embraced by firms
that are members of the AICPA's SECPS as a condition of that membership. The specifics of that
review are governed by firm policies adopted as part of the SECPS program, and policed by the
peer review process established by the SECPS. None of this is part of, or necessary to comply
with, GAAS.
The SEC requires that the financial statements of public companies be audited by an independent
public accountant. Under SEC Regulation S-X, the resulting audit opinion must state whether the
audit was made in accordance with GAAS. Among other duties, GAAS requires that auditors
obtain "[s]ufficient competent evidential matter ... through inspection, observation, inquiries, and
confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
audit," and "exercise 'the proper degree of professional skepticism to achieve reasonable
assurance that material errors or irregularities will be detected.'" Potts, slip op. at 10-11 & n.25
(citation omitted). In signing the firm's audit report, the auditor in charge, usually a partner, takes
responsibility for the audit's compliance with these standards.
Neither Regulation S-X nor GAAS requires a concurring review or sets standards for carrying
one out5. The SECPS membership requirement of a concurring review is not generally
applicable, but applicable only to AICPA members, and firms that are not AICPA members may
conduct public-company audits in full compliance with GAAS and SEC regulations without any
concurring review at all.
Under the SECPS guidelines for concurring reviews, concurring partners are affirmatively
instructed not to assume the responsibilities of the partner-in-charge:
For the concurring review to be an objective review of material accounting, auditing or reporting
issues, the concurring reviewer ordinarily should not assume any of the responsibilities of the
partner-in-charge of the engagement. Similarly, the concurring reviewer should not have
responsibility for any segment of the engagement.
AICPA, SECPS, Appendix E (October, 1988). The partner-in-charge has sole responsibility for
ensuring that the audit complies with the requirements of GAAS and for so stating in the audit
report, and that responsibility cannot be delegated or shared.
The Potts majority erred in attributing GAAS status to SECPS guidelines for concurring partner
review, and thus requiring the concurring reviewer to perform tasks and meet expectations
imposed by GAAS on the partner-in-charge. Pursuing this line, the majority referred to the
literature describing the GAAS duties of an auditor, and misapplied what it found there to Potts.
Thus, the majority relied on the GAAS requirement that all auditors "must perform their work
with due care" in finding that a concurring partner must perform all audit duties mandated by
GAAS. Rejecting the defense that these standards, as applied to concurring reviewers, were
hitherto undefined, the majority simply missed the point, asserting that "[t]he relevant
professional standards we apply here are all taken directly from accounting literature. These

standards were just as applicable when Potts performed his Kahler audit work as they are today."
Potts, slip op. at 12 n.27. So they were and are, to auditors, but not to reviewers. The obligation
of reviewers is defined, not by GAAS, but by SECPS guidelines and by additional standards
adopted by their firms in conformity with those guidelines. The SEC erred in announcing and
applying a new and inappropriate GAAS standard here.
The SEC majority relied on three cases to support its approach. None of these was contested, and
analysis of them emphasizes the lack of precedent for the majority's application of GAAS to
concurring review.
Only one of the cases cited by the SEC majority concerns a concurring partner at all. In Lester
Witte & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 17,423, ASR No. 285, [1937-1982 ASR Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,307, at 62,865 (Jan. 7, 1981), the SEC did not sanction the
concurring partner, even though it found the concurring review inadequate because the
concurring reviewer did not pursue noted or obvious deficiencies in the audit. Rather, the SEC
found that the failure of the concurring partner was attributable to the inadequacies of the firm's
review program, and to the partner-in-charge: "As the engagement partner on the Lippincott
audit, [the partner-in-charge] bears responsibility for the audit deficiencies which occurred." Id.
at 62,865-66. Lester Witte's emphasis on the need for adequate firm guidelines acknowledges
that standards for concurring review are not in GAAS, but are the separate responsibility of the
firm, consistent with the SECPS guidelines. Lester Witte contradicts, rather than supports, the
SEC majority's assertion in this case that the SECPS guidelines were a recognized part of GAAS.
Neither SEC v. Thornton , Litigation Release No. 11,263, AAER No. 118, [1982-1987 AAER
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,518 (Oct. 16, 1986), nor Stephen O. Wade ,
Exchange Act Release No. 21,095, AAER No. 32, 30 S.E.C. Docket 972, 1984 WL 53374 (June
25, 1984), deals with a concurring reviewer under the SECPS guidelines. In Thornton , one of
the respondents was responsible for an "impartial quality control review." Thornton , [1982-1987
AAER Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 63,389-3. Even regarding this respondent as
equivalent to a concurring reviewer, Thornton offers no standard for his conduct. In Wade , one
of the respondents was the "second partner" on an audit, and was a "designated savings and loan
expert" at the accounting firm. Wade , 30 S.E.C. Docket at 978, 1984 WL 53374, at *7. The
SEC's opinion does not distinguish between the "second partner" and the partner-in-charge in its
analysis of their conduct. Id. at 979, 1984 WL 53374, at *9. Like Thornton , Wade offers no
standards or guidance applicable to a concurring partner under the SECPS program, and no
suggestion at all that the SECPS guidelines are part of GAAS.
The absence of any authority in either the professional literature or SEC cases for applying
GAAS to Potts' conduct makes it clear that the SEC actually engaged here in improper
retroactive rulemaking, unfairly burdening Potts with the results6.
B. The SEC Erred In Applying GAAS Audit Requirements To Potts' Conduct.
Having erroneously concluded that SECPS guidance for concurring review was part of GAAS,
the SEC majority then erroneously construed the duties of an SECPS concurring partner, and
imposed on Potts the responsibilities of a partner-in-charge under GAAS. It was his failure to do

what he was not required to do that the majority held was sanctionable misconduct. For example,
the SEC majority asserted that Potts, as concurring partner, was required to:
• "Probe" the partner-in-charge, Melsen, to test the reasonableness of Melsen's assessment that
Kahler was committed to disposal of UPH after Melsen met with Kahler's audit committee.
Potts, slip op. at 14.
• Suggest that Melsen speak directly with the potential buyers of an interest in UPH. Id.
• Ask Melsen for documentary evidence supporting his statements. Id.
• Ascertain that sufficient competent audit evidence relating to valuation of UPH supported
Kahler's deferral of UPH operating losses, although the Top File included a document prepared
by a Touche Ross senior manager verifying the valuation of UPH, and Melsen had
communicated that Kahler's audit committee was comfortable with the valuation. Id. at 15-16 &
n.35.
• Conclude that formal audit committee minutes in the Top File, reflecting the numbers and
assumptions that committee concluded were reasonable with respect to the valuation, was
insufficient competent evidential matter of Kahler's intent to sell, under Standard of Field Work
3 applicable to auditors.
• Challenge Melsen's statement that changes in the UPH valuation were made to correct errors
in the valuation by Touche Ross's Chicago Valuation Office. Id. at 16.
All these measures — even if the majority were correct that they should have been taken — are
not the responsibilities of a concurring partner under the SECPS guidelines. The SECPS's
guidance as to the duties of a concurring partner describes a limited range of duties which do not
include participation in the audit itself:
The concurring reviewer's responsibilities should include reading the financial statements and the
firm's report thereon and making an objective review of significant accounting, auditing or
reporting considerations. Such review should ... include discussions with the partner-in-charge of
the engagement and review of selected working papers. The extent of working paper review is a
professional judgment which has to be made by the reviewer and will vary with the particular
circumstances of each engagement.
AICPA, SECPS, Appendix E (October, 1988). The majority does not suggest that Potts failed to
comply with these guidelines in themselves. See Potts, slip op. at 23 n.55. The findings all
erroneously measure Potts' conduct by GAAS's audit requirements, and every finding of
misconduct is accompanied by citation to GAAS, promulgated by the AICPA and applicable, in
terms, to auditors.
The majority concedes that
[a]s an initial matter, we agree with Potts that he, as concurring partner on the audits, did not act
unreasonably when he was satisfied initially with his partner Melsen's indications that Kahler
intended to dispose of its entire interest in [UPH]. We also agree that Potts, upon becoming
aware of audit documentation and his partner's concerns that Kahler planned to sell only a partial
interest, acted reasonably in meeting first with [Kahler's CEO] and then in directing Melsen to
inquire further about Kahler's intentions regarding the hotel.

Potts, slip op. at 13-14. The misconduct found by the majority consisted only in Potts' failure to
take additional steps after the partner-in-charge had investigated, with Potts' supervision, their
concerns regarding the accounting treatment of UPH, and had explained to Potts that he was
satisfied. The additional steps required by the majority would improperly substitute Potts'
judgment for that of the partner-in-charge, and would impose upon Potts the undelegable
responsibility of the partner-in-charge.
The error of the SEC majority's analysis of Potts' conduct under GAAS is highlighted by its
insistence that Potts should have applied "professional skepticism" to the statements made to
him, not by Kahler, but by the partner-in-charge, Melsen. Under the SECPS guidelines, the
concurring reviewer is not to assume the partner-in-charge's responsibility, but to act in an
advisory, concurring capacity. The "objective review" and "discussion" referred to in the
guidelines did not mandate that Potts replace the partner-in-charge's judgment with his own as
the result of a skepticism as to Melsen's candor or his ability to perform his duties. Such an audit
of the audit is neither required nor permitted by the SECPS guidelines.
Further, the majority's repeated insistence that Potts should have obtained audit evidence
graphically illustrates the majority's confusion of the responsibility of the audit engagement team
with that of the concurring partner. Under the SECPS guidelines, the extent of the concurring
partner's review of the evidence obtained is left to his professional judgment in the
circumstances. The duty to obtain "sufficient competent evidential matter" (1 AICPA, AICPA
Professional Standards, AU § 150.02 (1997)), or to obtain further evidence in certain cases (id. §
150.04), or to assess its source (id. § 326.19), remains that of the audit team and ultimately the
partner-in-charge. The SEC majority found noncompliance with each of these inapplicable duties
to be improper professional conduct by Potts. See, e.g. , Potts, slip op. at 14 & n.30, n.31, n.32.
In all of this, the SEC effectively announced and applied a changed set of standards for
reviewing partners, unintended by the SECPS regime and inconsistent with it. Those new
standards offer no useful guidance to reviewing partners except that they can only be safe if they
largely re-do the audit. That, in turn, prohibitively overburdens the reviewing partners, their
firms, their clients who must pay for the redundant work, and those firms whose resources make
such an endeavor impractical and are thus foreclosed from auditing public companies. And it
undermines the most important single safeguard of the integrity of the audit process — the
undiluted authority and responsibility of the CPA partner-in-charge who signs the audit opinion.
II.

THE SEC ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER POTTS' CONDUCT
PRESENTED A FUTURE THREAT TO SEC PROCESSES.

The current Commission is divided on the question of what state of mind is required for
sanctions of accountants under Rule 2(e).7 See Potts, slip op. at 27; Checkosky, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,094, 52 S.E.C. Docket 1122, 1133, 1992 WL 211479, at *12 (Aug. 26, 1992)
(Checkosky I ); Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Checkosky, Exchange Act
Release No. 38,183, 63 S.E.C. Docket 1691, 1700, 1997 WL 18303, at *10 (Jan. 21, 1997)
(Checkosky II ); see also Carter, Securities Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172-73 (Feb. 28, 1981).

Regardless of the state of mind required for sanctions under securities laws or Rule 2(e), the
misconduct supporting a Rule 2(e) sanction must, at a minimum, evince a present threat to the
integrity of the SEC's procedures or to the investing public.
The SEC's authority to sanction professionals under Rule 2(e) is justified only by the SEC's
authority to protect its own procedures, not by any authority to punish wrongdoers:
The Commission, through its Rule 2(e) proceeding, is merely attempting to preserve the integrity
of its own procedures, by assuring the fitness of those professionals who represent others before
the Commission. Indeed, the Commission has made it clear that its intent in promulgating Rule
2(e) was not to utilize the rule as an additional weapon in its enforcement arsenal, but rather to
determine whether a person's professional qualifications, including his character and integrity,
are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the Commission.
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979). The SEC itself has recognized the
limits of its authority to impose Rule 2(e) sanctions:
[Rule 2(e)] is addressed to a different problem — professional misconduct — and its sanction is
limited to that necessary to protect the investing public and the Commission from the future
impact on its processes of professional misconduct.
Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,149-50; see also Checkosky II, 63
S.E.C. Docket at 1703, 1997 WL 18303, at *12.
The remedial, rather than punitive, nature and purpose of Rule 2(e) require that the SEC sanction
an accountant only when he is currently unfit to practice, or poses a risk to the public. In Johnson
v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit vacated SEC sanctions under 15
U.S.C. 78o(b)(4), because it found them punitive rather than remedial, and the applicable statute
of limitations had therefore run out:
This sanction would less resemble punishment if the SEC had focused on Johnson's current
competence or the degree of risk she posed to the public. Despite the SEC's claims to the
contrary, however, it is evident that the sanctions here were not based on any general finding of
Johnson's unfitness as a supervisor, nor any showing of the risk she posed to the public, but
rather were based on Johnson's alleged failure reasonably to supervise...
Id.; see Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 ("[i]f the purpose of Rule 2(e) is to protect the integrity of
administrative processes, then sanctions for improper professional conduct under 2(e)(1)(ii) are
permissible only to the extent that they prevent the disruption of proceedings") (J. Silberman,
concurring); see also Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S.
91 (1981).
Consistent with the SEC's and the courts' view that only conduct that threatens the SEC's
processes is sanctionable under Rule 2(e), the ABA Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings (the
"Task Force") concluded in a recent report that Rule 2(e) sanctions should be imposed only when
an accountant poses such a threat:

Whether one agrees with the [Checkosky] majority's position that state of mind is not
determinative of whether to find improper professional conduct, or Commissioner Johnson's
view that scienter is required, the Task Force believes that the criteria discussed in the
Checkosky opinions fail to address what should be the central focus of a disciplinary proceeding:
whether, taking into account all of the facts concerning a respondent, including his or her past
conduct and current circumstances, the respondent poses a current threat of future conduct
harmful to the Commission's processes.
Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings, Comm. On Federal Regulation of Securities, American
Bar Ass'n Section of Business Law, Report of the Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings: Rule
102(e) Sanctions Against Accountants, 52 Bus. Law. 965, 977 (May 1997).
The Task Force's compelling argument considered: the possibility that lesser standards for Rule
2(e) sanctions may not pass judicial muster as remedial rather than punitive; the severe effects of
SEC sanctions on a public accountants' career; and the lack of clarity or consensus in the
Checkosky decisions as to state of mind. Drawing upon other contexts in which the SEC seeks to
preclude individuals from practicing before it, the Task Force concluded that the SEC should
impose a Rule 2(e) sanction only where an accountant is "substantially unfit" to practice. Id. at
985. In each context examined, the SEC's authority to suspend or enjoin individuals from
practice relied on a showing that future violations are likely. See id. at 978. The Task Force
believes that the application of differing standards to sanction accountants is unjustified, and that
the application of similar standards will provide consistency and predictability. See id. at 985.
The Task Force argues that its recommended standard of "substantial unfitness" is therefore best
measured by the same factors applied by the SEC and the courts to sanctions barring a defendant
from serving as an officer and director and to injunctions against practicing before the SEC:
[T]he Commission ought to consider and expressly discuss the egregiousness of the underlying
conduct, whether the conduct involved an isolated failure or was part of a continuing pattern of
misconduct, the accountant's "role" or position when he or she engaged in the conduct, the
accountant's degree of scienter, and the accountant's economic stake in the violation.
Id. at 985-86. The Task Force's recommendation is both consistent with the authorized purpose
of Rule 2(e) and good policy.
The majority's opinion includes only a single sentence regarding Potts' current fitness to practice:
"Potts' substantial departures from his professional duties establishes that this Commission
cannot rely upon Potts to perform diligently and with reasonable competence his audit
responsibilities." Potts, slip op. at 19. Given the pervasive error of the SEC majority as to what
Potts' "professional duties" and "audit responsibilities" properly were, this conclusory "finding"
is unsupported by any substantial evidence and cannot be sustained. Cf. Stephen Inv. Sec., Inc. v.
SEC, 27 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Johnson, 87 F.3d at 490 n.9.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the order of the SEC in its entirety as requested by Petitioner.
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process akin to common law, to evolve rules binding on registrants and their professionals. Still
less may it do so retroactively. See Carter, Securities Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,173 (Feb. 28, 1981) (because SEC had never
adopted standards applicable to respondent, and because no generally accepted norms applied at
the time, interpretation only prospective); Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (court
cannot defer to the SEC's interpretation of its rules if doing so would penalize an individual who
has not received fair notice of a regulatory violation).
7

The SEC avoided the question of whether negligence is an adequate basis for Rule 2(e)
sanctions by characterizing Potts' conduct as reckless. Even assuming that recklessness is the
applicable state-of-mind requirement, the SEC measured Potts' conduct against the wrong
standard in arriving at its determination of recklessness.
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